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It is sometimes said that humans are unlike other animals in at least one 
crucial respect. We do not simply form beliefs, desires and other mental 
states, but are capable of caring about our mental states in a distinctive way. 
We can care about the justification of our beliefs, and about the desirability of 
our desires. This kind of observation is usually made in discussions of free 
will and moral responsibility. But it has profound consequences, or so I shall 
argue, for our conception of the very nature of beliefs and other mental states. 
Suitably developed, it allows us to draw a line between two distinct ways in 
which a creature may possess a belief, represent a scene, and fall into error. 
The first way (which I shall call the 'mindless' way) involves little more than 
an encoding of information in some way designed to guide appropriate 
response. This is the common heritage of humans, and many other animals. 
The second way (which I shall call the 'mindful' way) requires that the 
creature be capable in addition of a special kind of second-order reflection, 
and (importantly) be expert at detecting the kinds of situation in which such 
reflection is called for. The differences between these two ways of 'believing 
that P' are sufficiently deep and significant to warrant (or so I claim) our 
treating them as two distinct classes of mental states. For it is only courtesy of 
the second layer of complexity, I shall argue, that it becomes proper to hold 
someone accountable for their beliefs or other mental states, and it is this fact 
of (something like) accountability that in turn raises the most significant 
challenge for philosophical attempts to give naturalized accounts of meaning, 




Mental states (perceptions, beliefs, and emotions) all come, I shall argue, in 
two distinct varieties. One variety —which I shall call 'mindless'— involves 
little more than an encoding of information in a way poised to guide action or 
response. The other variety —which I shall dub 'mindful'— is marked by the 
availability of the mental state for critical reflection and revision. A being who 
can be brought to see that one of her beliefs, perceptions (or even emotions) is 
inappropriate, given the available evidence or the prevailing circumstances is 
displaying mental states of the second (mindful) variety. 
 The distinction between beliefs that are susceptible to arguments and 
evidence-based rational revision and those that are not is, of course, highly 
prominent in the literature on epistemic justification. A belief is properly 
justified, it is sometimes argued, only if it has been formed in some reason-
and-evidence sensitive manner, or (on more complex accounts that bring us 
more closely still to the kind of thesis I shall be defending) if the agent is able 
to reflect critically on the belief itself (Kim, 1994). I shall argue, however, that 
the ability to discharge certain doxastic duties (especially those involving 
critical reflection) can be equally illuminating with respect to a taxonomy of 
mental states. More specifically, I show that the openness of a mental state to 
various kinds of reason-based correction is crucial to the determination of the 
normative status of the mental state itself and thus to our regarding it as 
belonging to a specific cognitive kind. The failure to factor this into our 
conception of the nature of mental states (rather than simply their 
justification) is especially damaging, I shall finally suggest, in discussions of 
the prospects for naturalized accounts of belief, meaning, and content. For the 
challenges posed by the naturalization projects are radically different in the 




1. EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY 
 
The target of the present discussion is, as remarked above, a broadly 
responsibilist notion of a distinctive sub-class of beliefs and mental states. It 
will be useful to begin, however, with a brief review of epistemic 
responsibilism: the view that being justified in believing that p crucially 
involves the fulfillment of certain duties. The major competitor to this view is 
the 'reliabilist' approach linking epistemic justification to the de facto truth 
conduciveness of the procedures, methods, and mechanisms of belief 
formation1. A responsibilist (or deontological2) approach by contrast is one 
that seeks to understand epistemological terms such as justification, evidence, 
warrant, etc. in some very strongly normative fashion, i.e., as relating to 
notions of requirement, duty, blame, obligation, and the like. This normative 
dimension can be seen in the following passage (Chisholm, 1982, p. 7): 
 
The simplest way of setting forth the vocabulary of the theory of evidence, or 
epistemology, is to take as undefined the locution, "__ is more reasonable than __ for 
S at t" (or alternatively, "__ is epistemically preferable to __ for S at t"). Epistemic 
reasonability could be understood in terms of the general requirement to try to have 
the largest possible set of logically independent beliefs that is such that the true 
beliefs outnumber the false beliefs. The principles of epistemic preferability are the 
principles one should follow if one is to fulfill this requirement. 
 
 Being justified in believing that p is thus —for Chisholm— a matter of 
degree. It is also, and most importantly, a matter of conducting our enquiries 
                                     
1 There are, of course, as many reliabilist and responsibilist views of epistemic 
justification as advocates of either. The reliabilist group includes, among others, D. M. 
Armstrong (1973) and Alvin Goldman (1986, 1987, 1988) For responsibilism see e.g. L. 
BonJour (1985), R. Chisholm (1977, 1982) and S. Cohen (1984). For a very detailed map of 
current positions, especially of what it is known in the literature as 'virtue epistemology' see 
G. Axtell (1997). 
 
2 I shall use the terms 'responsibilism' / 'responsibilist' and 'deontologism' / 
'deontologist' as having, roughly, the same sense unless otherwise noted. For a precise 
characterization of responsibilism as a subclass of deontologism see Lorraine Code (1987). 
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in such a way as to ensure that we tend, in general, only to accept those 
beliefs that are most likely to be true. To reach what Chisholm calls 'positive 
epistemic status' is thus for an agent to fulfill a certain kind of epistemic 
responsibility, that of trying to succeed in achieving a certain state of 
intellectual excellence by bringing about a situation in which one's beliefs are 
likely to be mostly true. This connection between epistemic justification and 
epistemic responsibility is sometimes cashed out in terms of 
(un)blameworthiness. 'A subject (S) is justified in believing that p' is presented 
as having the same truth-conditions as 'S deserves not to be blamed for 
believing that p' (see e.g. Bedford Naylor, 1988). 
 At this point, the major problem afflicting epistemic responsibilism 
becomes visible. For the question arises how to unpack this notion of being, 
or failing to be, blame-worthy. And it has seemed to many that blame-
worthiness must in turn depend on the extraordinarily problematic notion of 
voluntary control: that a subject deserves to be blamed for believing that p 
only if she has voluntary control over the entertainment of her belief. 
Deontological accounts thus seem to require the truth of doxastic 
voluntarism, i.e., the truth of the idea that believing or not believing that p is 
within the agent's power3. 
 Consider, however, a promising alternative approach. Kim (1994) 
defends a version of epistemic responsibilism that highlights not the initial 
formation of a belief (an occurrence which, rather plausibly, is seldom if ever 
within an agent's direct control), but the agent's later duties to critically reflect 
on her beliefs. In this latter kind of case, it seems plausible to suppose that the 
act of critical reflection is one that an agent can properly speaking will: we 
can decide that such-and-such a belief requires critical reflection, and take 
appropriate action. 
                                     
3 For a thorough discussion, see Alston (1988). 
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 Granted, there is always room for meta-level worrying. Even if I can be 
properly said to will my act of critical reflection in a way in which I cannot 
properly be said to will my first-order beliefs, it is not obviously the case that 
I can decide when to will such acts. At this point, the fan of these versions of 
epistemic responsibilism might invoke a Frankfurt-style consideration (e.g. 
Frankfurt, 1971) distinguishing the will the agent has from the will the agent 
wills herself to have. An agent who has the will she wants, and who decides 
to critically reflect on a certain belief, may well be exhibiting all the voluntary 
choice that responsibility requires. 
 It is not my purpose, however, to delve any deeper into the attractions 
and pitfalls of the 'critical reflection' versions of the deontological approach. 
Instead, I want to highlight one further, and quite deep problem. It is the 
problem of knowing which beliefs require critical reflection. For as Tidman 
(1996) correctly points out, we cannot be called upon to critically examine all 
of our beliefs. Yet, it is surely not the case that the unexamined beliefs are 
thereby unjustified. The spirit of the proposal, clearly, is that we are duty-
bound to critically examine those beliefs in need of critical examination. But 
how are we to know which these are?4 This is a problem to which we shall 
later return. 
 So far, then, I have sketched one promising version of epistemic 
responsibilism: a version which locates our epistemic duties in a somewhat 
non-standard place. The justification of belief turns, on this account, not on 
the fulfillment of epistemic duties relating to the initial formation of beliefs, 
but on subsequent duties to critically reflect on the beliefs we come, by 
whatever means, to hold. In the next section, I develop a closely related 
account not of epistemic justification but of the nature of beliefs (and other 
mental states) themselves. 
 
                                     
4 For an illuminating recent discussion, see Katzoff (2000). 
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2. MINDFUL BELIEVING 
 
In the natural world, there seems to be a reasonably sharp boundary between 
those systems capable of critically examining their own mental states, and 
those which, while no doubt possessing mental states of various kinds, are 
always disposed to accept them at face value. A rat or a snake may learn to be 
cautious, and (after some negative reinforcement) cease to respond to surface 
cues in the same way as before. But it seems unlikely (though not, I suppose, 
impossible) that these animals engage in anything that might properly be 
seen as critical reflection on the relation between their beliefs and the 
evidence they have for them. 
 It is my contention that this marks a difference not merely5 in the 
justifiedness of beliefs, but in the nature of the belief-states themselves. Beliefs 
that are prone to self-administered critical evaluation are conceptually 
special, and constitute (if you will) a cognitive kind. The failure to distinguish 
this special class of mental states results, I shall suggest, in a variety of 
unnecessary misunderstandings, especially regarding the prospects of 
naturalized accounts of beliefs (and other mental states). 
 The observation, then, is that not all states of believing (to focus on the 
basic case) involve contents to which the agent bears a certain crucial 
relationship, viz. one in which the content is itself a potential object of critical 
reflection. The cognitive or conceptual role of mental states which exhibit this 
kind of self-critical openness is so importantly different from the cognitive or 
conceptual role of mental states not thus critically open that it becomes 
fruitful to regard the mental states themselves as exemplars of different 
cognitive kinds.  
                                     
5 Perhaps not even —I am not committed to epistemic responsibilism, but merely 
deploy it as a structural analogy. 
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 Haugeland (1998) marks the crucial distinction using his parable of the 
permuting family. We are to imagine a human family, each member 
characterized by a set of features such as visual appearance, smell, voice, gait, 
etc. Then, one day, the permuting begins (Haugeland, 1998, p. 261): 
 
Sister sounds like Father, moves like Grandma, and smells like Kid Brother. Even the 
parts could mix up: Mother's head (but Father's hair) on Uncle's torso with Baby's 
limbs —or just two heads with no limb or torso at all (sounding like a truck and 
smelling like a watermelon). And moments later they switch again, with new 
divisions and new participants. What would you say? 
 
 
I know what I would say. I'd say "have I gone mad?" And that, in essence, is 
Haugeland's point. The human agent, he suggests, would quite likely tend to 
reject what they seemed to perceive. The perceptual beliefs would be subject 
to, and fail to meet the standards of, critical scrutiny. But what, he goes on to 
ask, about the (presumably un-permuted) family dog. Here is Haugeland's 
guess (Haugeland, 1998, p. 262): 
 
I think the dog would bark ... would be disoriented and distressed, maybe even 
frightened. But I can't imagine any part of a dog's reaction amounting to a rejection of 
the scene, a discounting of its reality, on the grounds that it's impossible. 
 
It is Haugeland's claim that the lack of such critical reactions shows that the 
dog "holds no objects to constitutive standards and therefore understands 
nothing" (op. cit., p. 262). The dog does not see things as objects. Likewise if, in 
our perception of the world, we fail to satisfy the standards for recognizing 
things as objects, we will possess what Haugeland calls 'mundane skills", but 
lack "constitutive skills". Mundane skills are basic kinds of know-how, like 
running, hitting, catching, and recognizing a strike in baseball. Constitutive 
skills focus on the acceptability or legality of actions, such as proper batting 
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order, etc. (op. cit., pp. 323-324). They are, in essence, skills at recognizing the 
legal and the rational, and are thereby poised to support various kinds of 
cognitive policing, both of the self and of others in the community. 
 Without such cognitive policing, Haugeland believes, it is strictly 
improper to speak of a system's understanding, thinking, or (if language-
using) meaning anything by its words. Surely, however, this is a little too 
strong. Better to allow that the cognitively unpoliced system may 
nevertheless count as a locus of various world-and-self directed mental states, 
but that these mental states are simply different from (many of) our own. 
 Consider, for example, the case of Capgras Syndrome. Capgras 
sufferers come to believe that a spouse or loved one has been replaced by a 
perceptually indistinguishable copy (often a robot)6. The sufferer apparently 
does not (indeed, cannot7) adopt (towards this belief) the critical stance 
                                     
6 One explanation of the syndrome is that the Capgras patient suddenly lacks (due to 
some neural disturbance) her standard affective response to the other person, and that she 
rationalizes the mismatch between surface cues and affective response by positing an 
impostor. See e.g. Ellis & Young, 1990. Stone & Young (1997) argue that the patient is thus 
exhibiting a rational response to an anomalous perceptual experience. What remains clear, 
however, is that (for whatever reason) these patients are incapable of the kind of potentially 
belief-revising critical activity which Haugeland posits in the case of the 'permuting family' 
(but see note below). Yet, despite this, Stone & Young argue that the belief formation process 
is sufficiently well-constrained and conducted so as to yield a genuine state of believing: the 
Capgras "patients do really believe the things they say they believe" (Stone and Young, 1997, 
p. 334). The question of whether the process of belief fixation that results in the delusional 
belief is in some sense a rational process is thus complex. But the contrast with Haugeland's 
cameo is sharp nonetheless. 
7  At least in most cases. Ramachandran and Blakeslee (1998) report a case of Capgras 
Syndrome in which the patient appears, at some point, to take a mildly critical stance toward 
his belief that his parents are imposters. Thus, when asked why he thinks his father is an 
imposter, he replied: “That is what is so surprising, doctor. Why should anyone want to 
pretend to be my father? Maybe my real father employed him to take care of me, paid him 
some money so that he could pay my bills” (Ramachandran and Blakeslee, 1998, p. 159). But 
notice he does not question his senses —the critical attitude is “outward looking” and falls 
far short of the self-critical stance Haugeland requires. Even the patient’s momentary attempt 
to rationalize the situation —momentary because the original delusion very quickly returns— 
does not invalidate my main point regarding Capgras Syndrome patients’ beliefs. For two 
reasons: a) the patient’s (brief) belief-revising activity highlights the fact that —pace 
Haugeland— some sort of understanding is present, but b) the fact that the patient is still 
unable to reject the whole situation as impossible, i.e., the fact that, in his attempt to 
rationalize it, he still cannot help but presupposing the existence of two people: his real father 
and the imposter, illustrates that the patient’s belief does not meet the (constitutive) 
standards that would turn it into the kind of semantic state for which he can be held 
responsible. 
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favored by Haugeland. Yet, it seems highly implausible to suppose that no 
thoughts or understanding are genuinely present. 
 Doubtless there are many moves and counter-moves to pursue at this 
point. But rather than getting submerged in this local dialectic, I propose 
instead a division in the space of genuine mental states. Let us say that S’s 
belief that p is mindful iff the following two conditions are met: i) S is a well 
functioning cognitive system and ii) S could reasonably be expected to fulfill 
her critical duties relative to p. To fulfill one's critical duties is, in this context, 
to undertake the various commitments involved in holding or withholding a 
belief and to be ready to engage in evidence and reason weighing activity 
concerning one’s right to that belief. When these conditions for mindful 
believing are met, then praise or blame become appropriate with respect to 
actions predicated upon the belief. 
 Thus consider first a compelling case of 'cognitive deficiency'. Take, for 
example, the person suffering from Capgras Syndrome who falsely believes 
her spouse to be a robot. It seems likely that she cannot be blamed for the 
wrongness of this belief because at least one of the two conditions for mindful 
believing has not been met: the subject or, more accurately, the subject’s 
cognitive sub-system involved in the production of this particular belief is not 
functioning properly8. In a case like this, we can talk of a pathological belief, 
i.e., a belief which is the outcome of some physical malfunction in the 
subject’s cognitive sub-system which produced the belief in question. A belief 
for which the subject is therefore not responsible. 
 Of course, the concept of cognitive deficiency is not clear-cut. Alston 
(1988) describes the puzzling case of a college student who can't correctly 
understand Locke's views. The case is supposed to illustrate the ultimate 
                                     
8  In so restricting physical malfunction to the relevant sub-cognitive system that brings 
about the belief in question, we avoid the obvious objection that all beliefs sustained by e.g. a 
Capgras Syndrome patient are pathological. Obviously, the same subject can have other 
kinds of beliefs, if e.g. these are brought about by a well-functioning sub-cognitive 
mechanism (see below). 
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insufficiency of epistemic responsibility for epistemic justification9. As Alston 
depicts the situation, the suggestion is that the student can't help but believe 
something false. In particular, the student believes: 
 
(L) According to Locke, everything is a matter of opinion, 
 
instead of believing 
 
(K) According to Locke, one's knowledge is restricted to one's ideas. 
 Alston insists that there is nothing the student can do to improve his 
understanding of Locke. The student " ... doesn't have what it takes to follow 
abstract philosophical exposition or reasoning" (op. cit., p. 287). This seems to 
suggest an interpretation of the case as indeed an example of (mild) cognitive 
incapacity. But now consider a different reading of the student's cognitive 
deficiency: one involving what might be better dubbed cognitive lassitude or 
cognitive thoughtlessness. Here we are assuming that the student has the 
potential to identify the mistake in his own belief, but (for whatever reasons) 
he simply fails to use this potential. Here, we can claim that in some concrete 
sense —to be pursued in Section 3— the student should have known better. It 
now makes sense to place the student within the space of responsibility, 
expecting him to be capable of learning by way of reasoned discourse. The 
student's belief, on this scenario, belongs to the category of mindful beliefs. 
 So far I have portrayed cases of pathological beliefs, i.e., cases in which 
cognitive sub-mechanisms involved in the production of the belief are 
malfunctioning and cases of mindful beliefs, i.e., situations involving subjects 
who can be held responsible because the two conditions of mindful believing 
are clearly met. I next introduce a further category, which I'll call mindless 
beliefs. Mindless beliefs are those held by subjects who are well functioning 
                                     
9 See Steup, 1988, pp. 78-81 for a critical discussion of this example within an 
epistemological framework. 
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cognitive systems but who fail to meet the second condition of mindfulness10. 
Certain perceptual beliefs belong to this category. Think, for example, of 
forming the perceptual belief that there are three steps in front of you as you 
walk out of your front door. Your body movements adjust accordingly, but 
you fall on the fourth step. Some kind of perceptual illusion has taken place. 
The environment has played a 'trick' on you. This is the kind of situation in 
which, despite normal functioning, you need accrue no responsibility for 
your slip. You are not responsible because you could not reasonably have 
been expected to critically examine the belief that led to the fall, nor (even had 
you examined it) to recognize that the perceptual belief was probably in error. 
 It is important to highlight here that the relevant failure in this case —
i.e., the failure that makes a belief like this one belong to the mindless and not 
to the pathological category— lies in the environmental conditions, not in any 
internal malfunction. The distinction is parallel to e.g. the legal distinction 
between an insanity and an (excusable) ignorance plea11. As in the (excusable) 
ignorance scenario, the way in which the perceptual illusion arose has 
nothing to do with any faulty cognitive sub-mechanism. 
 We can, of course, go on to learn about the illusion, even becoming 
expert at spotting the unusual conditions which promote it and taking extra 
care. To do so —to reach the point at which the perceptual array directly 
presents itself12 to you as one requiring extra caution— is to cross the 
boundary, to convert the one-time mindless belief into a mindful one. Now, if 
                                     
10  Here, again, one may want to introduce the restriction stated above regarding the 
cognitive sub-mechanisms actually involved in bringing about the belief in question. I omit 
this further specification in order to keep the flow of the text clearer. 
11  It is also worth mentioning that this account presupposes that the cognitive system 
stops short of the surrounding environment. Although that view has been criticized lately 
(see e.g. Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991; Clark, 1997), a discussion of how these recent 
views on embodied and embedded cognition might affect our treatment of belief lies beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
12 By 'directly presents itself' I mean that the type of perceptual array can be spotted as 
illusion-fostering without any external prompting, e.g., being told by a trustworthy person 
that it is illusion-fostering. 
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you fall again, due to the illusion, we may indeed hold you somewhat more 
responsible. For now, unlike before, you really should have known better. 
 But isn’t the mindless / mindful characterization then best described 
as applying to the agent, rather than the belief? After all, it is the agent who is 
open to correction when she holds a mindful belief13. This kind of objection 
would only be threatening if the general notion of belief discussed here were 
just that of a mental state with a particular content. However, a belief, as it is 
understood in this paper —and as it is usually understood elsewhere— 
comprises both the representational content of the mental state itself and the 
subject’s attitude toward that content. The availability for critical reflection 
that comes with the notion of semantic responsibility aims at capturing the 
precise nature of that special attitude toward a representational content that 
constitutes what I have called mindful belief. Since the notion of mindful belief 
involves both the content and the agent’s attitude toward it, a difference in 
attitude can indeed imply a difference in the class of belief at hand. The 
individuation of the content of such a belief may be achieved in a variety of 
ways —situation semantics, information semantics, causal theory, etc; 
nothing in this paper favors or undermines any of those accounts. But what 
determines the relevant normative status attached to a particular belief is the 
different conceptual role played by such a representational content within the 
subject’s overall cognitive economy. 
In the same vein, to talk about the kinds of beliefs that the notion of 
semantic responsibility generates as pertaining to the attitude component of a 
belief seems to suggest that such a responsibility is an internal matter. And 
yet the idea of a subject’s accountability being based on the subject’s expertise 
seems to locate this notion in some kind of external realm. I believe the 
assumed dichotomy here is not without problems. But for present purposes, 
all that matters is that the tension is only apparent. The notion of intellectual 
                                     
13  I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this to me. 
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obligations involved in the idea of possession of this kind of expertise has to 
be understood against the background of a paradigmatically non-
propositional ability; the ability to realize that a particular situation requires 
the agent to step back and critically appraise the situation. As such, the 
mechanisms by which an agent realizes that some critical appraisal is needed 
are thoroughly sub-personal. It would thus be a mistake to characterize this 
notion of expertise in externalist terms since the expertise consists in a 
particular way of the subject’s becoming aware; it involves, in other words, a 
change in the subject’s stream of consciousness. This, hopefully, will become 
clearer below, as I develop the notion of expertise in connection with the idea 
of critical ‘pop-out’. 
It is in cases where the normative status of a belief belongs to the 
mindful category that naturalization projects face the greatest difficulties. As 
will become clear in the last section of the paper, the difficulty lies, not in 
giving an account of the representational content of a belief but in properly 
explaining the relation of accountability between agent and content captured 
by the notion of semantic responsibility. 
 This possibility —for a particular belief to fall on different sides of the 
mindless / mindful boundary depending on whether or not conditions 
external to the content of the belief itself are met— also illustrates a related 
and important point. In order to ascertain the kind of cognitive role that a 
belief plays in a particular situation, and hence to discover under which of 
our tripartite taxonomy it falls, we don’t necessarily have to look at the total 
state of the system / agent holding the belief. It might be that, for instance, a 
depressed person or a person with brain damage impairing some aspect of 
her cognitive apparatus is still capable of meeting all three conditions of 
semantic responsibility regarding some particular belief or set of beliefs14. 
That would be the case if we were to consider e.g. a Capgras Syndrome 
                                     
14  I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this to me. 
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patient’s belief about any matter not related to the alleged replacement of her 
beloved one by an impostor. In a case like this, what counts is a) whether or 
not the cognitive sub-mechanisms involved in the production of that subset 
of beliefs are working properly and b) whether the sort of forward-looking 
tuneability by way of reasons characteristic of mindful beliefs is in place. That 
kind of tuneability may be present regarding a particular belief even for 
subjects who are quite incapable —due to either temporary or partial damage 
to their cognitive systems— of meeting those conditions for other beliefs. 
 In the same way, we need not expect all a subject’s beliefs within a 
given domain to change from one type (e.g. mindless) to another (e.g. 
mindful) en masse, even if the agent becomes an expert15 in that particular 
domain. Again, what matters is a relation of accountability that involves the 
agent’s attitude toward the content of a particular belief. To return to our 
original example: the subject who learns to spot the unusual conditions which 
promote a perceptual illusion regarding the number of steps at her door 
could still hold a mindless belief —rooted in a similar optical effect— 
regarding the number of windows in her neighbor’s house. 
 Obviously, a great deal of work is here being done by a notion of what 
an agent could reasonably have been expected to produce by way of on-the-
spot critical reflective response. It could be the case, for instance, that a 
subject actually exceeds reasonable expectations. That may happen when e.g. 
a Downs Syndrome person displays a surprisingly critical attitude toward 
some limited subject, or even a single belief. It would be a mistake, however, 
to deny the normative status of mindful to this subset of beliefs based on an 
overall consideration of the subject’s cognitive capabilities since what matters 
is whether the conditions that conform the notion of semantic responsibility 
are met for each of the beliefs considered. If the person suffering from Downs 
Syndrome can, nevertheless, display a particular kind of expertise regarding 
                                     
15  This notion of expertise will be unpacked in more detail in the next section. 
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a given domain, one which is not impaired by those cognitive deficits that 
actually make her a Downs Syndrome patient, then it makes sense to claim 
that the subject could ‘reasonably be expected’ to fulfill her critical duties 
relative to beliefs in that domain. This notion, and its attached pitfalls, are 
further examined in Section 3. Notice finally that the taxonomy we have 
constructed (pathological, mindless and mindful) is applicable not just to 
beliefs but to emotions, hopes, fears, and (as far as I can tell) the entire 
panoply of what might intuitively be classified as mental states. A certain 
feeling, for example, might be first classified by an agent as a feeling of 
depression, and then subjected to a kind of critical appraisal (perhaps as part 
of a treatment method). The sudden upsurge of anger you feel when another 
driver cuts you off on the highway might likewise be appraised and rejected 
as inappropriate. 
 The class of mindful mental states thus comprises all those kinds of 
mental contents capable of participating in what is sometimes glossed as the 
'space of reasons' (Sellars, 1963). Such states are subject to a certain 
'constitutive ideal of rationality' (cf. Davidson, 1970, p. 98), and answer to 
what Brandom (1994, p. 5) calls a "mastery of proprieties of theoretical and 
practical inference". In entertaining this kind of belief we reveal ourselves as 
participants in a variety of strongly normative practices. By that I mean not 
only that mindful beliefs have content, are either true or false, express 
propositions, etc. —the same can be said of the mindless category of beliefs—, 
but that the bearer of mindful beliefs relate to them in the relationship of 
accountability captured by the notion of semantic responsibility. It is this 
extra layer of normative commitment that makes mindful beliefs, as I'll argue 
in the final section, the very hardest cases for resolutely naturalistic 
treatment. 
 The distinction between mindful and mindless beliefs is probably 
closest to Daniel Dennett's useful (and underappreciated) distinction between 
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beliefs and opinions (see Dennett, 1978, in which he credits R. de Sousa, 1971). 
Dennett follows de Sousa in depicting belief as the basic "less intellectual" 
phenomenon and assent to a proposition as the "fancier" one involved in, for 
example, both making up and changing one's mind. Assenting to a 
proposition, on Dennett's account, involves taking an attitude to (roughly 
speaking) a mentally rehearsed sentence, while being in the more basic state 
of simply believing such-and-such is determined by the pattern of non-verbal 
actions to which a creature is disposed. Phenomena such as weakness of will 
depend, Dennett argues, on the possibility of conflict between the beliefs 
implied by a pattern of actions and the beliefs explicitly endorsed in 
sentential formulations —a possibility which is simply not present in the 
simpler case (cf. Dennett, 1978, p. 307). 
 Dennett labels the two kinds of cognitive state beliefs and opinions, 
where opinions are "the verbally infected ... states of language-users" and 
beliefs are "the deeper states" shared with frogs, dogs, and so on (cf. Dennett, 
1987, p. 233). So deeply different are these two kinds of cognitive state that we 
should, Dennett, suggests "simply view [some of our intuitions] as about a 
different category of mental state, the state of assent, i.e. opinion, not belief" 
(Dennett, 1978, p. 304). 
 Dennett's proposal is thus quite close, both in motivation and 
execution, to our own. But there are two notable differences. The first, and 
least important, is that unlike Dennett I want to paint (what Dennett calls) 
'opinion' as, indeed, a kind of belief. To do otherwise is, I think, to depart too 
far from entrenched usage (this may, indeed, help explain why Dennett's own 
distinction has never fully taken root in the literature). But second, and much 
more importantly, the mindful / mindless distinction I champion is only 
contingently related to capacities of language-use and sentential rehearsal. It 
may well be that the capacity to treat one's own beliefs and mental states as 
objects of critical appraisal is greatly enhanced by the capacity to speak and 
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share a public language, and by various cultural and communal practices of 
verbal rehearsal, exchange and critique. But there are, I want to claim, no 
conceptual entailments in this vicinity: it is perfectly possible for a non 
language-user to know when and how to treat some of its own mental states 
as hostage to error, and to step back and reappraise those states accordingly, 
It is, of course, notoriously and inevitably hard to convey, in words, exactly 
how such a process might go. But one can imagine, perhaps, a kind of 
"architectural intelligence" that thinks 'in images' about possible building 
designs, and is able, at crucial moments, to critically re-examine aspects of an 
emerging plan to check whether certain constraints on good design (the 
arrangement of load-bearing walls and columns, etc.) are actually being 
followed. The example is fanciful. But the general intuition is not: it is that 
Dennett is absolutely right to distinguish two deep categories of belief-like 
mental state, but wrong to tie the difference directly to facts about "linguistic 
infection" and the mental rehearsal of sentences. The deep divide is, rather, 
determined by a profound difference in the patterns of normative 
commitment and critical sensitivity in relation to which the state is poised to 
participate. Language-use may expand and amplify the scope of these more 
"norm-hungry" mental states. But it in no way constitutes their presence. 
 
 
3. KNOWING WHEN TO WORRY 
 
Mindful beliefs (and other mindful mental states) are subject to revision via 
distinctive processes of critical appraisal. And it is this openness to rational 
(reason and evidence based) appraisal that allows them to play a special kind 
of cognitive role. They are suited to participate in chains of reasoned thought 
and argument, and —when expressed in language— in extended and iterated 
episodes of interpersonal argument and truth-seeking. Human science is, 
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perhaps, the crystalline version of this special kind of cognitive economy. 
This fundamental division in the space of mental states —quite possibly the 
most fundamental division for many philosophical purposes— thus also 
cross-cuts the much-discussed divides between the conceptual and the non-
conceptual (see Toribio, forthcoming) and even the conscious / non-
conscious. 
 Two major worries, however, rapidly loom. The first one concerns the 
status of those mental states sustained by systems, e.g. animals, which do not 
seem capable of critically examining their own mental states and which, 
according to the taxonomy defended here, naturally belong to the mindless 
kind. It could be argued that, when a trainer teaches an animal to respond to 
certain cues, the animal engages in chains of inference. Suppose, for instance, 
that a trainer teaches a dog to navigate a maze —at the end of which some 
desirable food is found— by teaching the dog to turn left and right at blue 
and red signs, respectively16. Is it not correct to claim that the success of this 
training consists in the dog having learnt to infer which way to turn from 
identifying colors? 
 Such a scenario, would only threaten to blur the mindless / mindful 
distinction given a very weak interpretation of the notion of inference, the 
kind of interpretation that e.g. is usually applied when discussing the 
representational products of sub-personal cognitive functioning. Think, for 
instance, of peripheral sensory neurons like the rods in the retina. The 
amount of neurotransmitter these cells release varies as a result of changes in 
light intensity. There is a weak sense in which these neurons may be said to 
represent the property of there being a certain temporal and spatial density of 
photons at a certain retinal location and a correspondingly weak sense in 
which the system infers certain conclusions concerning the intensity of 
                                     
16  This example was provided by an anonymous referee whom I thank for pointing out 
this concern to me. 
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ambient light from these representational states. Notice, however, that the 
contents of those representations cannot play the role that we have assigned 
to the notion of mindful belief. Since the system cannot alter these voltage 
discharges by way of reason, nor is it able to spot the kind of situation in 
which such corrections would be advisable, the system is not semantically 
responsible for its representations, and that is, in the end, the mark of 
mindfulness regarding a particular mental state. 
 To explain the success of training by saying that the dog has learnt to 
infer which way to turn from identifying colors makes sense only if the notion 
of inference that we are using is characterized as a case of mere forward-
looking tuneability. It would, however, be a mistake to claim that those 
mental representations are mindful based on that simple kind of tuneability. 
We would only be justified in making that stronger claim if the dog were 
capable of engaging in a rather more complex inferential process, that of 
forward-looking tuneability by way of understanding reasons. 
 The second worry concerns the notion of cognitive culpability that looks 
to be implied by the stress on (roughly speaking) our reasonable expectations 
of cognitive policing. For the distinguishing mark of a mindful mental state, 
as I have described it, is that it is a state for which the agent can, in a certain 
sense, be held to account: a state such that if it is in error, we can hold the 
agent responsible for the error (or, more broadly, for the inappropriateness of 
the state). 
 But, as Tidman (1996) nicely pointed out (see Section 1 above) in his 
analysis of the notion of epistemic justification, we cannot reasonably expect 
an agent to be continuously critically assessing all her beliefs and mental 
states. We cannot even expect an agent to be continuously critically assessing 
all her mindful beliefs and mental states, i.e., all those sufficiently open to such 
appraisal in the first place. So just what is being required of the mindfully 
believing agent? I shall argue that what is actually required is the possession of 
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simply one more (in Haugeland's terms) mundane skill —viz., the mundane 
(but meta-level) skill of knowing when to worry. Mindful beliefs, mindful 
language-use, and mindful mental states in general are all constituted, in this 
account, by the presence of a well-tuned capacity to know when to worry: a 
capacity which, I shall argue (possibly counter to Haugeland's analysis) 
involves nothing more than the development of one more kind of expertise —
a kind of expertise especially well nurtured, however, by the special linguistic 
and social environments characteristic of the human species. 
 To begin pinning this down, let's once again consider some cases. A 
subject is viewing a straight rod through a prism that causes it to appear 
gently curved. It is an interesting fact that, under such circumstances, the rod, 
if touched, will also feel curved17. Now imagine that three agents are 
confronted with the experimental scenario in which they are shown the rod 
and proceed to view and touch it, with viewing mediated by the prism. The 
first agent is a young child. The second is a non-specialist adult. The third is a 
light and optics expert. Now imagine, finally, that the agents are placed in a 
forced choice situation in which they must rapidly judge whether the rod is 
straight or curved. If they judge correctly, a large charitable donation will be 
made by a rich company. If they judge incorrectly, the donation is forfeit. 
 Suppose, as seems likely, that the young child (overly influenced by 
the information from touch) gets it wrong. It seems unreasonable to expect 
anything else, so the action is based on a perceptual belief that is (in our 
terms) mindless. Not so, however, with the optics expert. If she makes the 
wrong call (overcome, perhaps, by the stress and anxiety of the situation), we 
feel she really should have known better. In particular, she should have 
known that this was a situation in which to worry: one in which to critically 
appraise her own perceptually-based inclinations. The non-specialist adult 
presents an intuitively fuzzy case. It is not immediately clear whether she 
                                     
17 For this and other similar examples, see R. Welch and D. Warren (1986). 
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should have known to worry. In seeking to resolve such a case, we might 
appeal to general details of her education and communal surround, or 
introduce a variety of mitigating factors. It is quite possible, indeed, that 
certain cases are intrinsically fuzzy, and that in those cases there is no clear-
cut answer to the question of whether the agent "should have known better". 
This uncertain middle, given the relative clarity of the two ends of our 
continuum, is, I believe, to be embraced. For it allows our taxonomy of mental 
states to be fuzzy at exactly the points where we are intuitively uncertain how 
best to understand what it is that the agent does or does not know, and hence 
what exactly her cognitive duties actually are. 
 The underlying explanation of the uncertain cases is, I think, 
instructive. What makes a mental state mindful, on this account, is in part the 
relations it bears to bodies of expertise that enable the agent to know when to 
worry. But such expertise comes in degrees, and so, in consequence, do the 
notions of mindfulness and mindlessness as applied to mental states. 
 We can now begin to resolve some of the problem presented earlier. 
An agent is able to know when to worry when she is, in a certain sense, an 
expert in a domain. Part of what it takes to be an expert cook, chess-player, or 
air traffic controller is learning, by trial and error and extended practice, how 
to spot the kinds of situation in which you need to step back and worry rather 
than simply trusting your automatic responses. The process of spotting these 
situations must, however (on pain of regress) itself be automatic. The "care-
needed" situations must simply "pop-out" to the expert. This crucial cognitive 
skill, which I shall call "critical pop-out" is —it seems to me— somewhat 
unjustly neglected in most philosophical and cognitive scientific discussion18. 
Haugeland (1998), despite his insistence on both skillful know-how and the 
                                     
18 Exceptions include DesAutels (1996) account of learning to perceive moral situations 
and Clark's (1996) criticism of simple connectionist models of moral cognition. There are 
signs, in addition, that new cognitive neuroscientific studies —e.g., neuroimaging studies 
tracking the interactions between automatic and more reflective responses, such as Drevets 
and Raichle (1998) and Raichle (1998)— may be starting to target these kinds of phenomena. 
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importance of a certain kind of "vigilance" (watching out for the illegal moves 
in chess, etc.), never quite connects the two in the way just described, namely, 
as requiring a further skill, similar in kind to any other expert skill, at 
detecting situations in which vigilance is called for. Churchland (1996) 
develops an account of moral cognition which assimilates it to a characteristic 
kind of 'connectionist' pattern-matching skill, tuned by long real-world 
experience, but likewise neglects the further (and arguably) morally crucial 
skill of knowing when not to trust the outputs of the basic pattern-matching 
process itself (see Clark, 1996). 
 If "critical pop-out" (the skill of knowing when to critically appraise 
your own and other's beliefs, assertions, and mental states) is indeed just 
another kind of expertise, acquired by training and experience (and realized 
in, let's assume, something like connectionist-style networks in the brain), a 
question arises as to why human agents, and not, apparently, dogs and cats, 
and so on, are able to develop and deploy this form of expertise. This is an 
empirical question which I am not competent to pursue in any detail, but it 
seems likely that the distinctive training regimes made available by public 
language and human culture play a large and empirically important role. 
This may require, in turn, some kind of "bootstrapping" story about the 
development of human language, since grasp of meaning is itself (on my 
account) a typical mindful achievement: we become sensitive to the 
conditions governing the correct use of words, and are poised to critically 
appraise our own and other's uses accordingly. Nonetheless, a story might 
well be told (see e.g. Dennett, 1996) in which initially mindless uses of grunts 
and tokens become progressively mindful as practices of communal usage, 
correction and training take root. Once such uses are in place, language looks 
increasingly capable of playing a role envisioned by Jackendoff (1996) —the 
role of enabling us to freeze our thoughts and ideas in a format which makes 
them cheaply and widely available as objects for further inspection, analysis 
 24 
and argument. It is this kind of rich social and linguistic environment, I 
suspect, that provides the essential training ground in which to nurture skills 
of self-reflection and (ultimately) critical pop-out. Whether there could, in 
practice, be non-language involving versions of such a training ground, I do 
not know. Though I am convinced (as argued earlier) that the role of public 
language is not constitutive with respect to the phenomenon of mindful 
believing, but is at most developmentally central and helpful in amplifying 
the scope of naturalness of critical intelligence. 
 Notice, finally, that the notion of "critical pop-out" is not to be 
assimilated to the much simpler notion of (if you like) "novelty pop-out". 
Novel situations do, to be sure, tend to engage our critical and reflective 
faculties. But the kind of expertise I am envisioning is also naturally 
displayed in situations with which we are quite familiar. For example, the 
experienced air traffic controller who immediately (and just in time) 
recognizes that her command to drop 300 feet and turn 30° west would cause 
a head-on collision, or the logician who spots the elementary error in her own 
proof. Of course, we do not always succeed in identifying such errors. But we 
are culpable when we fail to do so, precisely because these are mindfully held 
beliefs, properly subject to ongoing, pop-out based checking and appraisal. 
This, on the account I have been developing, is where the buck of 
responsibility finally comes to rest. For here we possess the requisite 
knowledge and skills, and we are, generally speaking, capable of deploying 
them so as to correct the error. Failure to do so (causally explicable though it 
must always be) is, in the only substantial sense available to us, a kind of 
moral failure. It is failure to live up to a standard to which we may properly 
be held to account: a standard which is, in a deep and abiding sense, our own. 
 
 
4. NATURALIZING THE MENTAL 
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I would like to end by commenting on one important implication of the story 
I have been sketching. It concerns the shape and prospects of naturalization 
projects in semantics and philosophy of mind. Such projects, it now seems are 
really targeting two quite distinct classes of phenomena: what we have been 
calling ‘mindless’ and ‘mindful’ mental states. But naturalizing the former is 
relatively unproblematic, while naturalizing the latter is (if it is possible at all) 
enormously more complex. By keeping the two classes of mental phenomena 
distinct, we are able to see what is wrong with certain anti-naturalist 
arguments while keeping sight of what is most problematic in the large and 
various realms of the mental. 
 Thus consider Haugeland’s (1998) rejection of teleologically based 
attempts to naturalize the notion of misrepresentation. Such attempts depict 
mental representations as ‘teleofunctional items’, i.e., as items which are 
produced by biological mechanisms that have been designed or selected 
during evolutionary history to perform some ‘proper function’. Given this 
characterization of representation in terms of proper function, Haugeland 
argues that such views cannot account for the crucial distinction between 
malfunction and misrepresentation. Here is how Haugeland (p. 310) presents 
his case 
 
Imagine an insectivorous species of bird that evolved in an environment where most 
of the yellow butterflies are poisonous, and most others not; and suppose it has 
developed a mechanism for detecting and avoiding yellow butterflies. Then the point 
can be put this way: if a bird in good working order (with plenty of light, and so on) 
detects and rejects a (rare) nonpoisonous yellow butterfly, there can be no grounds 
for suggesting that it mistook that butterfly for a poisonous one; and similarly, if it 
detects and accepts a (rare) poisonous orange butterfly ... in such cases, ... there is 
nothing that the response can “mean” other than whatever actually elicits it in normal 




 We can agree with Haugeland on the need to maintain a distinction 
between getting things wrong as the result of a malfunction in the system and 
getting things wrong when the system works normally. But we should 
disagree about the final verdict for teleological accounts. 
The problem is that Haugeland’s ontology is too austere to 
accommodate the genuine (but limited) virtues of this kind of naturalization 
project. For Haugeland, “when there is no malfunction, it’s as ‘right’ as it can 
be. In other words, there can be no biological basis for understanding a 
system as functioning properly, but nevertheless misinforming” (ibid.). 
Haugeland thus rejects the idea that the bird in any sense misrepresented the 
orange butterfly as edible. But this is, I want to suggest, needlessly extreme. 
For the example is now nicely captured as one of mindless misrepresentation. 
The environment has played a trick on the bird somewhat analogous to the 
one involved in the perceptual illusion (Section 2) regarding the number of 
steps at your front door. Remember that in that situation you were —by 
hypothesis— functioning normally and you certainly misrepresented the world 
in a specific way, viz. as containing three steps instead of four. Yet you were 
not responsible for the belief that led to your fall. Haugeland’s example, 
likewise, displays (I want to say) a case of misrepresentation without 
malfunction, and without culpable error: a case of what might thus be called 
mindless misrepresentation. And here lies the problem with Haugeland's 
analysis: it does not leave space for this important category. Yet without this 
distinction we tend to be blind to the real (but limited) value of many 
naturalization projects in semantics. 
The problem is not that a teleological view of content cannot account 
for the distinction between malfunction and misrepresentation. Teleological 
accounts can and do support that distinction. Where they fall short is in 
relation to a notion, not just of misrepresentation (misinforming), but of 
culpable misrepresentation —error that the system (agent, creature) could 
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reasonably have been expected to avoid. In other words, teleological accounts 
can and do support the distinction between malfunction and mindless 
misrepresentation, but they fail to account for the more mindful ways of going 
wrong (and right). 
Since mindful beliefs are the most distinctively human, the spirit of 
Haugeland's critique remains intact, but the fine print is important because it 
helps us to appreciate the following general lesson: it’s not that naturalized 
stories cannot account for the normative dimensions of mind and content tout 
court. Rather, they cannot simply redeploy the resources that nicely 
accommodate the kinds of normativity displayed in the simple ‘mindless’ 
cases so as to directly account for the more complex and reason-centered 
forms of normativity I have been describing. 
 It might be possible to give a neural and/or computational account of 
these reason-centered forms of believing. Indeed, nothing I have said so far 
precludes that possibility. I only intend to show that the structure and nature 
of standard teleosemantic explanations make them unable to capture the 
essential mark of mindfulness. A way to show the difficulty with such 
accounts is to focus on how the notions of success and correctness relate to 
each other when considering beliefs of the mindless and mindful kind. 
 To bring this into focus, let’s look at the bird example again. The bird-
species has learnt to use the perception of yellow as a sign of poison and has 
learnt to apply it appropriately (to avoid it) in a given task (foraging). The 
‘rightness of the signal’ is constituted by its success in this task19. The 
mechanism which detects yellow and triggers an avoidance behavior is 
properly in place. 
The correctness of a belief in the mindful cases, however, is not defined 
simply in terms of its outcome. An example. Joe, a trained logician, asserts 
                                     
19  I am here following Charles Taylor in his account of the explanatory direction(s) for 
the rightness of an action. See Taylor (1995a and b). 
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that St. Louis is larger than London. He knows London is larger than Paris, 
and just learnt, from a reliable source, that Paris is larger than St. Louis. His 
assertion is false, and misrepresents the size of St. Louis. His assertion is false 
not only and not essentially because he may fail in some extra-linguistic task 
involving the size of St. Louis (e.g. allowing himself more time than he needs 
to go from one neighborhood to another in the city). His assertion is false 
even if he never had and never would have any perceptual or causal 
interactions of any kind with St. Louis, London, or Paris. Moreover, he is also 
answerable for his mistake since he could properly be asked to provide 
reasons for his belief: reasons that would surely display an inferential 
network whose failings are both visible to Joe himself and completely 
independent of any further ‘outcome’ or any further behavior of his 
regarding the size of St. Louis. We thus say of Joe —but not of the 
insectivorous bird— that he should have done better. It is this crucial, but 
difficult feature —the feature of culpable cognitive failure— that characterizes 
the beliefs I have called mindful. 
To get things right, outside the mindful dimension, all that is required 
is success in a task or class of tasks. To get things wrong, outside this 
dimension, is to fail in a task or class of tasks. By contrast, agents believe 
mindfully in cases in which rightness is “irreducible to success in some 
extralinguistic task” (Taylor, 1995b, p. 103).  
 We thus gain a clearer picture of the problem with teleological 
accounts of semantic properties. Such accounts can accommodate only 
mindless misrepresentation, and one indicator of this is that rightness and 
wrongness remain defined solely in terms of success or failure in some extra-
linguistic task. To see that this is so, recall that representation consumption is, 
for e.g. Millikan (1984), more important than representation production. The 
content of a belief turns not on the causes of the belief so much as on the 
advantageous results that the belief brings about. Tokens of a certain belief type 
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have as their content that e. g. there is a poisonous butterfly in front of the 
bird if it is required (for evolutionary purposes) that there be a poisonous 
butterfly in front of the bird in order for the token to perform its proper 
function. Assuming that certain inner or outer tokens corresponding to a 
belief are produced if and only if a certain property is instantiated (e.g. there 
is poison around), such belief tokens would be wrong, would be mistaken, if 
they were produced when that property is not instantiated. 
 Since the notions of right and wrong present in teleological views are 
defined in terms of success or failure in some extra-linguistic task, they can 
account only for mindless (mis)representation. They can indeed ‘explain away’ 
the kind of normativity appropriate to that realm, but this is not the kind of 
normativity present in the cases of mindful believing. 
 It is a virtue of the proposed taxonomy, I believe, that it brings such 
issues to the fore, and that it clearly distinguishes the crucial-but-problematic 
sub-class of mindful mental states. For it is this sub-class of mental 
phenomena which must occupy center-stage in philosophical and scientific 
attempts to understand the distinctive features of the human mind. This is 
not, of course, to suggest that we should ignore the large class of mindless 
mental states which are the common heritage of the human, the rat, and the 
chimpanzee. Indeed, a variety of important conceptual and empirical 
questions need to be raised concerning the relations and interactions between 
the two classes of mental phenomena, but this is a task I must leave for 
another day. 
 To sum up, I have tried to draw attention to a major divide in the class 
of mental states. This divide (between what I have dubbed ‘mindful’ and 
‘mindless’ mental states) cross-cuts familiar classifications such as conscious 
and non-conscious, or linguistic and non-linguistic mental states, and even 
(though I have not argued this here) between conceptual and non-conceptual 
mental states (see Toribio, forthcoming). But it highlights, I claim, precisely 
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that which is most naturalistically problematic and most distinctively human 
about our daily mental lives: our ability not simply to know, but to know 
responsibly; to know in a way such that we may be held accountable for the 
truth or appropriateness of what is known. I have also suggested, albeit 
sketchily, that the vexing problem of knowing when to be critical of our own 
cognitive performances itself isolates a new and important kind of expertise, 
which we develop as part and parcel of the process of learning how to think, 
reason, and respond in various cognitive domains. 
 As a closing cameo, imagine a perhaps familiar scene. The expert 
bridge-player, after watching her opponents bid and make a crucial contract, 
asks herself (and her partner) some tough questions. She may ask herself 
whether the contract could have been defeated, and see that the answer is yes, 
had she but led a low spade on the 8th round, the contract would have been 
set. But she may (and should) go on to ask herself whether, and if so how, she 
could have known, at the time, to lead the low spade. It is this second round 
of questioning that reveals, I suggest, the most potent and distinctive 
dimension of human thought itself. We are not simply engines of efficient 
adaptive response. We are not even (simply) engines of counterfactual reason. 
We are engines that reason about reason itself, and that hold our own 
reasoning to account. We are able to ask (both of ourselves and of others) 
“should we have known better”? The cognitive and conceptual role of beliefs 
and other mental states open to such reason-based critical appraisal is 
sufficiently distinctive, I have claimed, to warrant treating such mental states 
as a special class of cognitive elements. These elements bear the mark of the 
mindful. They resist direct attempts at naturalization, and introduce 
important layers of complexity into our accounts of misrepresentation, belief, 
and understanding. We conflate them with their mindless neighbors at our 
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